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ll Supreme Court decisions are
important, and they are impor-
tant for different reasons. Some
decisions establish society-
shaping precedents or sharply alter the
direction of the development of the law.
Other rulings respond to or trigger critical
historical events. Some Supreme Court
cases are important because they involve
matters of life or death for the litigants and
perhaps, as a practical matter, for large
numbers of others as well. It is impossible
to compare the importance of these differ-
ent types of decisions or even to speak of
them as if they are tied together by a com-
mon thread. It is also impossible to say with
confidence that all cases selected for a list of
this kind do in fact merit inclusion. Other
informed observers will surely disagree with
some of my choices. (In fact, a number of
my colleagues already have.) 
The inevitably controversial nature of this
sort of listing reveals an important truth.
The decisions of the Supreme Court touch
the lives of Americans in a wide range of
powerful ways, and they have done so from
the first days of the republic. The 15 deci-
sions identified here illustrate the complexi-
ty, the variety and the significance of the
Supreme Court’s work as well as the key
role that controversies rooted in Georgia
have played in shaping our nation’s history.
I have not listed these cases in an order
designed to suggest my sense of their rela-
tive importance. Instead, I have tried to
arrange them in a way that highlights
how they relate to one another
and how they fit into the broad-
er tapestry of the court’s
work. The 15 cases are: 
Furman v. Georgia (1972) 
Before 1972, Georgia and other states that
provided for capital punishment used sys-
tems that afforded broad discretion to juries
in deciding whether to impose the death
penalty on persons convicted of death-eligi-
ble offenses. In Furman, the court struck
down this feature of Georgia’s capital sen-
tencing scheme and in effect invalidated the
death penalty, as then administered,
throughout the United States. The court, in
a five-to-four decision, reasoned that capital
sentencing based on the unguided discre-
tion of juries offends the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth
Amendment because it permits juries to
impose the distinctively profound sentence
of death on some convicted defendants
while other juries impose the far different
sentence of life imprisonment on far larger
numbers of similarly situated defendants
convicted of the same
crime. There was no
majority opinion in
Furman, but Justice
Potter Stewart captured
the thought of a critical
group of justices when
he wrote: “These death
sentences are cruel and
unusual in the same way that being struck
by lightning is cruel and unusual.” The
Eighth Amendment, he explained, “cannot
tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death
under legal systems that permit this unique
Spring/
Editor’s Note: The New Georgia Encyclopedia is a recently
launched, wholly online treatment of our state’s history, geography,
politics, literature, commerce and other related subjects. Last summer,
John Inscoe, UGA professor of history and editor of the encyclopedia,
invited Hosch Professor Dan T. Coenen to contribute a series of essays
on the most significant U.S. Supreme Court cases that originated in
the state of Georgia. The following article, which proposes an
unranked top 15 list, is built on this work. Coenen invites readers to
share any reactions to this essay by passing along comments – especial-
ly about other cases that would be proper candidates for this listing –
to coenen@uga.edu. He said, “Don’t hesitate to be critical because I
surely have overlooked some important information, and there is
always room for helpful discussion and disagreement about any list-
ing of this kind. Certainly, I can imagine no better set of consultants,
particularly on this subject, than the graduates of Georgia’s premier
law school.”  
By Hosch Professor Dan T. Coenen
Justice Potter Stewart
West Façade of the Supreme
Court Building
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penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly
imposed.” 
Gregg v. Georgia (1976)
Some observers predicted that Furman
would spell the end of the death penalty in
the United States. Many states, including
Georgia, however, responded to the
Furman ruling by enacting new death
penalty statutes. Some state legislatures
reformed their laws to deal with the prob-
lem of undue jury discretion by mandating
capital punishment for all persons convicted
of first-degree murder. The Georgia General
Assembly sought to deal with concerns
about arbitrariness by adopting a so-called
“guided discretion” capital-sentencing
scheme. Under this scheme, if the defen-
dant was convicted of first-degree murder
or another death-eligible offense, the prose-
cutor could ask the court to conduct a sec-
ond “penalty stage” of the trial. Following
this second proceeding, the jury could
impose the death sentence only if it found
that the prosecution had proven a statutori-
ly specified “aggravating circumstance”
(such as that the murder was motivated by
financial gain or directed at an on-duty cor-
rectional officer or a judge). In addition,
even if the prosecution proved an aggravat-
ing circumstance, the jury could decline to
impose the death sentence, and impose a
life sentence instead, if it found that “miti-
gating evidence” (such as emotional diffi-
culties or childhood abuse of the defendant)
warranted leniency in the particular case. In
Gregg, the court, by a seven-to-two vote,
upheld Georgia’s guided-discretion
approach to capital punishment, while in
companion decisions the
court invalidated other
states’ mandatory death-
penalty statutes as
“unduly harsh and
unworkably rigid.” The
decisive opinion in
Gregg, joined by justices
Stewart, Byron R. White
and John Paul Stevens,
reasoned that Georgia
had adequately
addressed the problem
of unfettered jury discre-
tion that had triggered
the court’s finding of a
constitutional violation
in Furman. The court
added that “respect for the ability of a legis-
lature to evaluate, in terms of its particular
state, the moral consensus concerning the
death penalty and its social utility as a sanc-
tion require us to conclude that [it] is not
unconstitutionally severe.” The “guided dis-
cretion” approach to the death penalty,
upheld by the court in Gregg, has been
adopted in a large majority of states and
continues to control capital sentencing in
murder cases throughout the nation to the
present day.
McCleskey v. Kemp (1987) 
In the wake of Gregg, litigants continued to
challenge capital sentences, and the most
far-reaching challenge came in the
McCleskey case. Warren McCleskey was an
African-American man convicted of mur-
dering a white police officer in Fulton
County. In attacking his death sentence,
McCleskey brought before the court an
expert statistical study that indicated that
juries in Georgia are far more likely to
impose the death penalty if the victim is
white and most likely to impose the death
penalty if the victim is white and the mur-
derer is black. This evidence showed,
according to McCleskey, that Georgia’s
guided-discretion scheme was so fraught
with race discrimination in its real-world
operation that it violated both the Eighth
Amendment and the Equal Protection
Clause of the 14th Amendment. The court,
however, rejected this argument, thus saving
Georgia’s capital sentencing scheme from
potentially insuperable constitutional diffi-
culties. Writing for a
five-justice majority,
Justice Lewis F. Powell
Jr. noted that
McCleskey had offered
“no evidence specific to
his own case that would
support an inference
that racial considerations
played a part in his sen-
tence” and added that “[w]here the discre-
tion that is fundamental to our criminal
process is involved, we decline to assume
that what is unexplained is invidious.” 
Coker v. Georgia (1977)
Despite the rejection of sweeping attacks on
capital sentencing in Gregg and McCleskey,
litigants have successfully challenged partic-
ular features of state death-penalty laws in a
number of Supreme Court cases. A particu-
larly significant ruling came in Coker v.
Georgia, which invalidated Georgia’s effort
to extend eligibility for the death penalty to
persons convicted of the crime of rape. In
finding this feature of the Georgia death-
penalty law unconstitutional, the Supreme
Court reasoned that punishments violate the
Eighth Amendment if they are “excessive in
relation to the crime committed,” that
determinations about excessiveness are prop-
erly informed by “country’s present judg-
ment,” and that the Georgia law could not
survive this type of inquiry because no other
state subjected persons convicted of the rape
of an adult woman to execution. Coker has
been read to establish that governments may
not extend the death penalty to most, and
perhaps all, non-murder offenses. In addi-
tion, the court has invoked the underlying
excessiveness rationale of Coker in later cases
to invalidate death sentences even for death-
related crimes, such as murders committed
by persons who are mentally retarded or
younger than 16 years old. 
Heart of Atlanta Motel 
v. United States (1964)
Many path-breaking Supreme Court cases
have grown out of Georgia’s long and tragic
history of race discrimination. Critical deci-
sions have concerned racially motivated
murders and beatings, deprivations of vot-
ing rights, and governmental segregation of
parks and other public facilities. Perhaps no
decisions have had a greater practical
impact, however, than Heart of Atlanta
Motel and its companion case from
Alabama, Katzenbach v. McClung, in which
the Supreme Court upheld the public
accommodations provisions of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. By 1964, it was well
settled that the Equal Protection Clause
barred almost all state-imposed racial classi-
fications that disadvantaged African
Americans. Discrimination in the private
sector, however, remained widespread.
Under the leadership of President Lyndon
B. Johnson, in the wake of the Kennedy
assassination, Congress mustered the will to
proscribe in broad terms racial discrimina-
tion by many private service providers,
including hotels, motels and restaurants
that sold food that had moved across state
lines. The constitutional difficulty was that
none of Congress’ enumerated powers
unequivocally supported the enactment of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and challengers
Justice Byron R. White
Justice John Paul
Stevens
Justice Lewis F. 
Powell Jr.
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assailed the legislation as impinging on state
prerogatives to regulate local matters free
from federal interference. A unanimous
court, however, found that the law was a
proper exercise of Congress’ Article I,
Section 8, power to “regulate Commerce ...
among the several States.” In effect, the
court reasoned that race discrimination by
even very localized businesses, when viewed
in the aggregate, had such far-reaching neg-
ative effects on the interstate movement of
people and products that Congress could
remove these impediments to commerce
whether or not its underlying motives arose
out of moral condemnation. Ensuing
enforcement of the Civil Rights Act led to
the dismantling of most overt forms of
racial discrimination, which in turn con-
tributed to the emergence of the “New
South” and the explosion of economic
activity that spread through the Sun Belt in
future decades.
United States v. Darby (1941) 
The decisions in which the court upheld the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 built on Commerce
Clause precedents handed down during the
presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt. During
his first term of office, President Roosevelt
sought to respond to the Great Depression
by pushing through Congress a program of
reform that deeply injected the federal gov-
ernment into regulation of such matters as
working conditions in local facilities. Relying
on constitutional arguments about state
autonomy, the Supreme Court invalidated
several of these laws during 1935 and 1936.
Following President Roosevelt’s landslide
reelection in 1936, however, the court dra-
matically shifted direction and began to
reject states-rights challenges to federal initia-
tives founded on the commerce power. A
critical juncture came in the Darby case,
which involved the prosecution of a lumber
manufacturer located in Statesboro for violat-
ing the minimum-wage and maximum-hour
protections put in place by the recently
enacted federal Fair Labor Standards Act.
Overruling earlier precedent, the court held
that the law was a proper exercise of the con-
gressional commerce power, including in its
application to local manufacturing concerns.
The rationale of Darby ushered in an era of
such extreme judicial deference to assertions
of congressional authority that no federal law
was found to exceed the commerce power
for the next 54 years.
Screws v. United States (1945) 
Congress’ enumerated powers reach beyond
the Commerce Clause, and a particularly
important grant of authority permits federal
legislators to enact “appropriate legislation”
to enforce the 14th Amendment’s prohibi-
tion on state action that deprives persons of
“equal protection” or “life, liberty or prop-
erty without due process of law.” Close on
the heels of the ratification of the 14th
Amendment, Congress passed several civil
rights statutes pursuant to this power,
including one that makes it a federal crime
for a person “willfully” to deprive another
of “any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution” if the depriva-
tion occurs “under color” of state law.
Although this statute had long lain dor-
mant, the federal Justice Department
invoked it in the Screws case to prosecute
three Baker County law enforcement offi-
cers who allegedly killed an African
American suspected of stealing a tire by
“beating him with their fists and with a
solid-bar blackjack” in the absence of any
provocation. After the defendants were con-
victed in federal court, the Supreme Court
in Screws ordered a new trial on the ground
that the trial judge had not given accurate
instructions to the jury
on the meaning of the
statutory term “willful-
ly.” (Justice William O.
Douglas observed that
“[e]ven those guilty of
the most heinous
offenses are entitled to a
fair trial.” Notably,
upon retrial, all three
defendants were acquitted.) The key prece-
dent established by the case, however, came
in the court’s declaration that the taking of
the victim’s life had occurred “under color”
of state law so that a prosecution under the
federal civil rights statute was permissible.
Three dissenting justices argued that the
beating did not meet the under-color-of-
state-law requirement because the defen-
dants had violated, rather than adhered to,
state law according to the prosecution’s own
evidence. The dissenters also urged that per-
mitting a federal prosecution for what they
viewed as a local murder would bring about
“a revolutionary change in the balance of
the political relations between the National
Government and the States.” The majority,
however, concluded it sufficed to meet the
under-color-of-state-law requirement that
“the officers of the State were performing
official duties,” whether or not “the power
they were authorized to exercise was mis-
used.” In so ruling, the court opened the
door for sweeping invocations of the long-
unused Reconstruction-era federal civil
rights statutes in ensuing decades. The
majority’s ruling also bespoke something
more – a rising willingness within the court
to address issues of racial injustice that
would, within a decade, produce the semi-
nal school-desegregation decision in Brown
v. Board of Education.
Gray v. Sanders (1963)
Chief Justice Earl
Warren once said the
most important judicial
pronouncements of his
tenure were not the
momentous school-
desegregation decisions,
but the Supreme Court’s
rulings that compelled
states throughout the
nation to reconfigure their electoral process-
es pursuant to the principle of “one person,
Justice William O.
Douglas
Chief Justice Earl
Warren
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one vote.” The very first of many Supreme
Court decisions that applied this principle
came as a result of a legal challenge brought
by James Sanders, a voter in Fulton County,
that targeted Georgia’s county-unit voting
system in its application to elections for
senator, governor and other officers chosen
on a statewide basis. The problem with the
system, according to Sanders, was that it
gave residents of small counties far more
voting power than residents of more popu-
lous counties. Indeed, the favoritism shown
to rural areas was so great that counties that
were home to only one-third of Georgia’s
population held a majority of county-unit
votes for purposes of selecting each of these
elected officials. In striking down this vot-
ing scheme under the Equal Protection
Clause, the court insisted, in an opinion by
Justice Douglas, that the American “con-
ception of political equality ... can only
mean one thing - one person, one vote.” In
its 1964 ruling in Wesberry v. Sanders,
another case out of Georgia, the court built
on Gray to hold that all federal congression-
al districts within a state had to be made up
of a roughly equal number of voters. In so
ruling, the court radically altered how state
legislatures would thereafter configure con-
gressional districts, which until then often
reflected long-established groupings of coun-
ties that ignored intervening urbanization
and other major shifts in population.
Within four months of Wesberry, the court
ruled in its most famous reapportionment
decision, Reynolds v. Sims, a case out of
Alabama, that the Constitution required the
equal valuation of votes in all elections for
representatives who served in either chamber
of any state legislature. As a result, the court
scuttled the legislative electoral systems of
most states, including often-used “little fed-
eralism” systems that, following the model
of the Constitution’s treatment of the U.S.
Senate, structured districts for one house of
the state legislature according to geography,
rather than population. The Warren court’s
reapportionment decisions, beginning with
Gray, dramatically reshaped the nature of
representative government in Georgia and
throughout the nation. No less important,
the principle of electoral equality that
underlies these cases has continued to gener-
ate important decisions in more recent times
– most prominently the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Bush v. Gore, which brought an
end to the spirited legal challenges triggered
by the presidential election of 2000.
City of Rome v. United States
(1980)
Race-based discrimination with respect to
voting has pervaded American history, and
Congress aggressively attacked this wrong
by adopting the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
At issue in the City of Rome case was the
most controversial provision of this statute,
which requires federal Justice Department
approval of any change in any voting prac-
tice put in place by a locale marked by a
history of discrimination if that change has
either “the purpose [or] the effect of deny-
ing or abridging the vote on account of race
or color.” This case grew out of an effort by
Rome to alter both the city’s electorate and
its electoral system by annexing neighboring
areas and adopting an at-large voting
scheme for the selection of city commis-
sioners. Rome offered evidence that it had
not pursued these changes with any racially
discriminatory purpose, but Justice
Department approval was denied nonethe-
less on the ground that the reforms would
have an adverse effect on the ability of
African Americans to secure local represen-
tation. Confronted with a constitutional
challenge to Congress’ authority to adopt
this effects-based standard, the court sided
with the Justice Department and blocked
Rome’s effort to reconfigure its method of
self-governance. In recognizing Congress’
power under the 15th Amendment to
attack the racially discriminatory effects of
voting changes, even in the absence of a
racially discriminatory purpose, the court
both sustained and illustrated the power of
the most far-reaching feature of modern
federal voting rights legislation.
Chisholm v. Georgia (1793)
Chisholm v. Georgia is the most famous and
the most important of the Supreme Court’s
eighteenth-century decisions. The court’s
ruling arose out of an action brought in
federal court by a citizen from South
Carolina to recover on a debt allegedly
owed to him by the state of Georgia. Upon
receiving notice of the action, Georgia
refused to appear. It asserted that, as a sov-
ereign state, it possessed immunity from
suit, absent its consent, even though the
Constitution specifies that federal courts
have jurisdiction to decide cases “between a
State and citizens of another State.” Citing
this text, the Supreme Court rejected
Georgia’s sovereign-immunity argument
and ordered Georgia to pay the South
Carolina plaintiff the money damages he
sought. In the wake of this decision, howls
of protest rose throughout the country.
Within five years, Congress had proposed
and the states had ratified the 11th
Amendment, which overturned the princi-
ple of Chisholm by providing that “[t]he
judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of
another State ... .” To this day, Chisholm
stands as one of only a handful of Supreme
Court rulings that have been overturned by
constitutional amendment. Even more
important, the Supreme Court has built on
the repudiation of Chisholm to hold that
the 11th Amendment exemplifies a sover-
eign-immunity principle that sweeps well
beyond the amendment’s text. Invoking this
principle, the court has sheltered states from
almost all money-damage actions brought
in any court, even when initiated by a
state’s own residents based on clear viola-
tions of federal statutory law. 
View of the east wall, bench and frieze of the court-
room where the Supreme Court has sat since 1935.
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Worcester v. Georgia (1832) 
Prior to the forced removal from Georgia of
thousands of Native Americans on the infa-
mous Trail of Tears, Reverend Samuel A.
Worcester was convicted in a Georgia court
for settling in the territory of the Cherokee
Nation without obtaining the required state
license to do so. In a decision that over-
turned this conviction,
Chief Justice John
Marshall laid down car-
dinal principles regard-
ing the relationship of
Native American tribes,
the nation and the
states. As he observed:
“The Cherokee nation,
then, is a distinct com-
munity, occupying its own territory, with
boundaries accurately described, in which
the laws of Georgia can have no force ...
but with the assent of the Cherokees them-
selves, or in conformity with the treaties,
and with the acts of congress.” Worcester is
well known largely because it was in
response to this decision that President
Andrew Jackson supposedly made his omi-
nous observation: “John Marshall has made
his decision, now let him enforce it.” Even
more important, the ruling and reasoning
of Worcester – and, in particular, its concep-
tion of Native American Nations as possess-
ing important elements of sovereignty – has
been drawn on in hundreds of ensuing
cases. To be sure, a theoretical commitment
to this principle of sovereignty has often
done little to protect Native American
Nations from the worst forms of oppres-
sion. Such protections as the institutions of
American government have afforded those
nations, however, sprung primarily from
notions of tribal integrity that trace their
roots to Worcester. 
Fletcher v. Peck (1810)
The Fletcher case arose out of the Yazoo
land scandal that came to light after bribed
members of the Georgia legislature voted in
January of 1795 to sell for a bargain-base-
ment price the vast frontier that comprises
most of modern-day Alabama and
Mississippi. A rescinding act adopted by a
later and more upright Georgia legislature
resulted in a constitutional challenge to the
act’s divestiture of title from prior buyers as
well as third-party purchasers who had
bought parcels of the tract from the original
grantees. In Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion
in Fletcher, the court sustained this chal-
lenge, establishing – as Professor Robert G.
McCloskey has written – “the first clear
precedent for the general proposition that
the Supreme Court is empowered to hold
state laws unconstitutional.” (The court’s
earlier and more famous decision in
Marbury v. Madison had recognized the
court’s ability to strike down acts of
Congress, without specifically considering
the court’s power to invalidate state laws.)
Fletcher is important for other reasons as
well. The case laid the basis for the impor-
tant principle that the limitations imposed
by the Impairment of Contract Clause
extend to governmental, as well as private,
contractual obligations. Even more impor-
tant, the court’s opinion in Fletcher hinted
at the notion that Americans may possess
judicially enforceable rights rooted not so
much in the specific language of the
Constitution as in “general principles,
which are common to our free institutions.”
Picking up on this theme, much of the
court’s most controversial work during the
remaining course of its history has explored
the extent to which the court may protect
human rights that do not find clear expres-
sion in the constitutional text. 
Doe v. Bolton (1973) 
The court in Fletcher may have flirted with
the notion of unenumerated individual
rights in part because the original Bill of
Rights applied only to the federal govern-
ment and not to the states. One conse-
quence of the Civil War, however, was the
adoption of the 14th Amendment, which
broadly (but obliquely) stipulated that: “No
State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law ... .”
After the Privileges and Immunities Clause
was given a narrow interpretation in 1872,
the court turned its attention to the Due
Process Clause. In a key line of cases, the
court concluded that virtually all of the Bill
of Rights guarantees – such as the rights to a
jury trial, to the assistance of counsel and to
confront one’s accusers – had been “incor-
porated” into the Due Process Clause and
thereby made applicable to the states. These
incorporation decisions did not concern
only the procedural safeguards afforded to
criminal defendants. They also barred the
states from, for example, interfering with the
substantive rights of free speech and the free
exercise of religion protected by the First
Amendment. The question next arose
whether this so-called “substantive due
process” principle embraced fundamental
liberties that lay outside of the express pro-
tections of the Bill of Rights. In a series of
decisions, dating back nearly a century, the
court held that such protections do exist.
Perhaps the most well known of these cases,
Roe v. Wade – as well as its companion case
out of Georgia, Doe v. Bolton – established
the principle that the Due Process Clause
affords broad constitutional protection to a
woman’s decision to terminate a pregnancy,
in consultation with her doctor, prior to the
period of fetal viability.
In Doe, Justice Harry A.
Blackmun, writing for
seven members of the
court, held that the
Constitution rendered
invalid not only absolute
bans on abortion but
more qualified prohibi-
tions as well – here, a
statute that, while generally outlawing abor-
tion, authorized the procedure upon
approval of a hospital committee in cases
that involved serious threats to the pregnant
woman’s health, risks of serious birth defects
if the fetus were carried to term, or a preg-
nancy that had resulted from rape. Rejecting
in particular the states’ committee-review
requirement, the court spoke broadly of
“[t]he woman’s right to receive medical care
in accordance with her licensed physician’s
best judgment.” 
Stanley v. Georgia (1969)
In another leading substantive-due-process
case, the court in the Stanley case held that
an individual has a constitutional right to
possess obscene materials even though
obscenity does not ordinarily enjoy protec-
tion under the First Amendment’s Free
Speech and Free Press
Clauses. In an opinion
by Justice Thurgood
Marshall, the court
declared that “funda-
mental is the right to be
free, except in very lim-
ited circumstances, from
unwanted governmental
Justice Thurgood
Marshall
Chief Justice John
Marshall
Justice Harry A.
Blackmun
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intrusions into one’s privacy,” particularly
the “right to satisfy [one’s] intellectual and
emotional needs in the privacy of his
home.” Drawing on earlier decisions, the
court emphasized the “right to receive ideas
regardless of their social worth” and
declared that the “makers of our
Constitution ... conferred, as against the
Government, the right to be let alone – the
most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized man.” Cutting a
channel for future legal developments, the
court also suggested that a constitutional
claim of the right to privacy “takes on an
added dimension” when it involves activity
“in the privacy of a person’s own home.”
Bowers v. Hardwick (1986)
Relying on the place-centered rationale of
Stanley, Michael Hardwick brought an
action that challanged the application of
Georgia’s criminal sodomy law to acts of
homosexual intimacy between consenting
adults that occur within the home. In a
five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court
rejected Hardwick’s argument, reasoning
that the court “comes nearest to illegitimacy
when it deals with judge-made constitu-
tional law having little or no cognizable
roots in the language or design of the
Constitution.” The court acknowledged
that “the cases are legion” in which it had
construed the Due Process Clause to pro-
tect important substantive personal inter-
ests. The court, however, found that none
of those cases mandated invalidation of
Georgia’s ban on consensual sodomy. The
court distinguished Roe and Doe, for exam-
ple, as involving the distinctively profound
and life-altering choice of whether “to beget
or bear a child” and reasoned that Stanley
was “firmly grounded in the First
Amendment.” The court’s decision in
Bowers, however, hardly ended debate about
the proper scope of constitutional liberty
possessed by homosexuals and other
American citizens. Justice Powell, who had
provided the critical fifth vote in Hardwick,
said of the case after his retirement from the
bench: “I think I probably made a mistake
in that one.” And, in 2003, a new five-jus-
tice majority, overruled the Bowers decision
in Lawrence v. Texas, declaring that a general
ban on consensual adult sodomy “furthers
no legitimate state interest which can justify
its intrusion into the personal and private
life of the individual.” ■
Georgia Law Students Attend 
Pledge Case as Guest of 
Supreme Court Justice
In late March, third-year student Kevin A. Gooch and
second-year student Kira Y. Fonteneau traveled to
Washington, D.C., to sit in on the U.S. Supreme
Court hearing of the Elk Grove Unified School District
v. Michael A. Newdow, et al. case as personal guests
of Supreme Court Associate Justice Clarence Thomas.
Later this year, the court will rule on whether the
Pledge of Allegiance should be banned from public
schools for its use of the words “under God.” To the
right, Fonteneau (l.) and Gooch (r.) are pictured on
either side of Thomas.
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